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Derivatives! Hardly a day goes by without some major story appearing in the business press on this
subject. To the press, the word has become virtually synonymous with bad investments and unexpected
losses. To the average person on Main Street, the word either means Spanish for "evil" or the latest
snake oil out of Wall Street. To Congress and regulators, it represents a major financial area that has
somehow escaped direct regulation and that potentially threatens the demise of the western world as we
know it. To the investment bankers and swap dealers, it represents a high-profit area, both in terms of
proprietary trading revenues and in terms of sales of products to customers. To institutional investors,
such as mutual funds, pension plans, college endowments, and state and local governmental authorities,
it provides an intriguing yet potentially dangerous opportunity to enhance portfolio returns. To
treasurers and corporate risk managers, derivatives provide a means to better manage a company's
natural exposures to interest rate, commodity, and foreign exchange risks. To the SEC and the FASB,
derivatives pose challenges both in terms of financial statement disclosures and on how companies
should account for hedging and risk management activities. To boards of directors and external
auditors, it represents an area of growing concern and potential liability. To the academic community, it
represents -- well, we'll talk about that later.
So it is that there are a variety of competing objectives and concerns over derivatives at various levels. I
call these the "derivatives wars." It is not just one war but various skirmishes and battles between
opposing forces across a number of battle fronts, each seeking to do the "right thing."
My objective tonight is to provide you with some personal observations and views on the subject -- if
you will, a battlefield report -- based on my own involvement and experiences in this area over the
years. To put this in its proper context, let me give you an overview of my areas of involvement.
As associate national director of Accounting and SEC at Coopers & Lybrand, L.L.R, I am regularly
involved in difficult accounting and disclosure issues that arise from our practice relating to derivatives
and other financial instruments. My experience over the past few years has been that often the
accounting and disclosures issues are merely the tip of the iceberg, with basic economic, financial,
control, and behavioral aspects lying beneath the surface.
As a member of the FASB's Financial Instruments Task Force and hedging working group, I have also
been involved in the accounting rule-setting in this area. Of course, I have witnessed firsthand the often
painfully slow progress in dealing with what is a difficult and complex challenge to the accounting
model.
Until recently, I headed a group within our firm that deals with the product developers on Wall Street,
advising them on the accounting and tax structuring of new derivatives and financing techniques. After
twelve years of involvement in that activity, I think I have gained a pretty good understanding of the
motivation and psyche of these highly creative and very well-paid individuals.
I also count among my own audit clients several investment bankers and swap dealers. As you can
imagine, the audits of these active traders of derivatives pose another set of challenges.
In the past year, I have also been involved in several control reviews of end users of derivatives at the
behest of senior management and/or board of directors. While I am happy to report that in some of these
cases the review was initiated by the company on a proactive basis and as a preventive measure, I have
also been on the scene after the fact of several "derivatives disasters," diagnosing the sick, bayonetting
the mortally wounded, and helping to heal the survivors.
Finally, I have over the years been and continue to be involved in my firm's internal policies and
training efforts related to financial instruments in general and derivatives in particular.
I therefore liken my role to that of a platoon sergeant; that is, leading the troops in the audit and
accounting battles, reporting up the line to the captains and colonels of senior management and boards
of directors and audit committees, and every so often being given the opportunity to share my
observations with the generals, such as regulators and rule-setters like the SEC and the FASB.
I am going to cover a lot of ground tonight and will provide you with my observations from the trenches
on issues relating to regulation, involvement of boards of directors and senior management, internal
controls, disclosure, accounting, and auditing of derivatives. I would also like to briefly pass on my
views on how you, the academic community, should be involved in this area.
Please understand that I am more qualified to talk on certain of these matters, such as accounting and
disclosure, than I am on others, such as regulation. That notwithstanding, I have never been accused of
being bashful and will offer my views on all these topics. I hope you understand, however, that
everything I say tonight are my own personal views and not necessarily the views of Coopers &
Lybrand.
Regulation of Derivatives
That having been said, I would like to talk briefly about my observations on the debates about possible
regulation of derivatives. Clearly, this is a very broad topic, which in my view really relates to at least
the three following facets:
1. Overall regulation of derivatives markets, both here in the U.S. and globally.
2. Possible regulation on the buy-side, that is, which types of investors and users should be
involved with which types of derivatives. This is sometimes referred to as "suitability."
3. Possible regulation on the sell-side, that is, what standards, if any, ought to apply to those
who market these products to potential buyers -- what is often referred to on Wall Street as
"sales practices."
Let me talk briefly about each of these aspects.
In regard to the overall market issues, the concern is that of so-called systemic risk, that is, that one of
the major financial institutions that is a dealer in derivatives or a major user of derivatives might fail,
which in turn might cause a chain reaction that could jeopardize the health of the whole financial
system, a sort of "domino theory" of derivatives. This is a concern that was first raised in early 1992 by
the then-president of the New York Federal Reserve Bank, Gerald Corrigan, and has since been argued
from time to time by certain other parties, most notably the GAO in its report to Congress on derivatives
last spring. The concern arises from the explosive growth of the derivatives market, recently estimated
at over $35 trillion in notional value, most of which relates to the off-exchange or so-called over-the-
counter products such as interest rate swaps, currency swaps, and foreign exchange contracts that are
not subject to regulation in a way that exchange-traded futures and options, or, for that matter, stocks
and bonds are. There have been congressional hearings on this topic and certain members of Congress
have proposed that either the SEC or a new regulatory agency, a Federal Derivatives Commission, if
you will, formally regulate this area.
While I again apologize that I am not the best qualified to comment on the merits of this concern, I
believe that it is somewhat overblown. To my knowledge, there has been much focus and guidance
coming out of such agencies as the OCC, the Fed, the FDIC, the NAIC, and others over the past two
years in this arena. For example, the SEC and CFTC have instituted rules requiring securities and
commodities trading firms to provide extensive detail on the derivatives activities of any affiliated
entities that are not directly regulated by the SEC or CFTC, with a goal of preventing a spillover of
losses by such affiliates to the regulated entities. Moreover, because of the global scope of this issue,
international groups such as the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, the Technical Committee of
the International Organization of Securities Commissioners, and the Group of Thirty have also
promulgated guidance in this arena. These efforts, which are aimed at dampening such risks, have
included not only guidance on the risk management policies to be utilized by institutions that trade
derivatives but also the appropriate oversight by boards of directors and senior management, as well as
revised capital adequacy standards, proposed netting arrangements between institutions, and expanded
and improved disclosures of derivatives positions. There is also a genuine concern, I believe, that
overregulation of U.S. derivatives markets could drive significant segments of the market overseas.
While Congress is obviously mindful of all this, and even with a pro-business, anti-regulation
Republican majority in Congress, it is always possible that, haunted by the specter of the S&L debacle
and in the wake of other recent events, such as the reported losses on derivatives sustained by the
government employees' credit unions, many members of Congress would rather err on the side of
increased regulation lest the doomsayers prove correct. I am not one of the "Chicken Littles," and in that
regard it is noteworthy that the derivatives and structured note markets seemed to have absorbed the
Orange County event without any significant market dislocations. I therefore believe that the threat
posed by derivatives lies less to the system as a whole than with the profitability and the financial
viability of individual institutions and individual companies, investments funds, and other entities that
are the users of, investors in, or traders of derivatives.
That, of course, brings me to the buy-side. I believe even a casual observer of the scene over the last
year would have to conclude that some safeguards are needed. I'm sure that the stockholders of such
companies as Procter & Gamble and Gibson Greetings, to name a few, as well as investors in mutual
funds that suffered losses due to derivatives would agree. Certain products are not appropriate for
certain users and there ought, in my view, to be clear speed limits in this regard. This applies
particularly to such entities as money market and mutual funds, pension plans, college endowments,
state and local government funds, and credit unions, who are trusted with the fiduciary duty of
preserving capital. While he probably meant it to apply only to corporate end users, I would take issue
with a former SEC Commissioner's statement in defense of managernent's prerogative to utilize
derivatives as they deem appropriate when he stated, and I quote, "We must keep intact the inalienable
right for individuals to lose money. If we ever lose the right, making money will become very hard
indeed." Again, while this statement was probably aimed at corporate end users, I would certainly take
issue with it in regard to the investment entities and funds where preserving invested capital is
paramount. I am sure you will agree that if it's your money were talking about that is invested in a
money market fund or a pension plan, management should not have an inalienable right to lose it on
your behalf! Enough said.
It might well be asked how is it that all these so-called "surprise losses" occurred. Was it that the buyers
just did not realize what they were buying, or was it that they did realize the potential riskiness of these
investments but chose to roll the dice? I think there is some of both aspects. While it takes two to tango,
it seems clear from public reports that in certain cases -- for example, Procter & Gamble and Gibson
Greetings -- the buyers may have believed they were dancing a slow waltz rather than a tango. And that
brings me to the sell-side.
Sales practice issues on Wall Street and across the country by other securities firms are, of course, not a
new issue. However, because of the lack of specific regulation on derivatives as well as their
complexity and virtually infinite variety, it certainly has provided a fertile area for product developers
and marketers. By and large, however, I believe that most major Wall Street firms have approached this
in a responsible manner. Indeed, many of them had instituted clear sales practice controls even before
the latest wave of problems. I think that there is a growing appreciation that in the absence of such
controls and codes of conduct, the institution runs the risk of not only greatly displeasing particular
clients, but more importantly, it runs the risk of jeopardizing one of its most important assets, that is, its
reputation. That notwithstanding, I continue even to this day to receive occasional calls from product
developers and marketing people at certain firms who (I will assume without the endorsement of their
employers) continue to seek loopholes in the accounting, tax, and disclosure rules. Maybe I am getting
older; while I used to enjoy such conversations with these Rambo types, I now have little patience for
them. By and large, however, these calls are becoming much less frequent. Clearly, it seems to me that
most of the big Wall Street firms that had not already done so have now made concerted efforts to
establish clear sales practices that will help potential buyers more clearly understand the risks and
rewards of a particular product. In fact, I understand that, in something of an initiative at self-regulation,
the big product dealers, under the auspices of the New York Fed, are developing a code of conduct in
this area. All this bodes well because, of course, as we know from reading the newspapers, there have
been some problems.
Again, going back to my analogy to dancing, I think one of my recent experiences helps to bring home
some of the thinking and motivations on both the buy and sell sides, which underlie some of the
fiascoes we have been reading about in the newspapers.
While somewhat similar to the Procter & Gamble case, this was not P&G, and, fortunately for the
company involved in this particular case, the degree of leverage embedded in the interest rate swap it
bought was nowhere near that in the P&G case. A few months ago, I got involved in a situation of a
Fortune 100 company whose senior management, after reading about the P&G case and others, began to
question the company treasurer about a certain interest rate swap the company had entered into. It turns
out that the swap was indeed a leveraged swap, which, depending on the velocity of interest rate hikes
during the particular reset period, could produce a leverage factor of 2.5 to 3 times. That is, if short-term
interest rates rose by 100 basis points, the rate the company would pay would rise by 250 to 300 basis
points. By the way, the P&G swaps reportedly had a leverage factor of around 10 times. As I got
involved in this situation, it became clear to me that heretofore, while senior management and the board
had been generally informed by the treasurer that the company had entered into a very sizable interest
rate swap to change fixed-rate debt to floating, no mention of the leverage feature had been deemed
worthy of communication up the line. Though I never got him to admit it, it was clear to me that the
treasurer did not fully understand the product. In fact, in my view, and if I can use this word, he had
been "seduced" by the investment banker who, back in August 1993, with interest rates at a modern low
and with the chief economist of his own firm predicting that rates would go up over the next twelve to
eighteen months, had convinced the treasurer that it was the perfect time to swap most of the company's
debt obligations from fixed to floating and convinced him that the best way to do this was to enter into
this particular swap. Although paying the company an above-market fixed rate, there was also what was
described as a very minor catch, that being that if interest rates rose, the impact of such raises could be
magnified. What the treasurer saw, I believe, was a way, at least in the short term, to reduce his
company's borrowing costs because of the receipt of the above-market fixed rate, but did not
comprehend or did not choose to comprehend the potential damaging impact that future rises in interest
rates might have on this rosy picture. So here we have it on both sides -- a willing but perhaps not
totally informed buyer and an eager salesman, both motivated by short-term objectives, that is, the
treasurer wishing to show his board how he could minimize the company's borrowing costs, and the
investment banker wishing to maximize his own personal cash flow.
Overall, however, I think that things are headed in the right direction, with the sellers of derivatives, in
the wake of Bankers Trusts settlement with the SEC over Gibson Greetings, having been sent a clear
message that they must take steps to ensure the risks and rewards inherent in an instrument (that is, the
behavior of the instrument across a range of possible market scenarios is clearly highlighted) and with
buyers increasingly realizing that they must fully understand an instrument and carefully consider the
suitability of it for their needs before they buy it.
Management and Boards of Directors
Most of the studies and releases by regulatory agencies and by study groups such as the Group of Thirty
and the GAO have pointed to the key importance of active involvement of management, boards of
directors, and audit committees in the oversight and control of a company's derivatives activities. With
that in mind, let me give you some of my views on this subject.
First, in terms of senior management involvement, while this of course varies from company to
company, I believe that there is now a clear appreciation by most senior management, from the CEO
down to the CFO and controller, of the need to get up to speed and involved in this area, and that in
comparing this with the situation eighteen months ago, there has been real progress. In the past, for the
end users, the subject of financial management, including the use of derivatives, was often left to the
treasurer and his group without much monitoring by the CFO, the controller, internal auditor, etc. Often
this whole area was viewed as not only complex but not related to the company's "real" business of
manufacturing product, extracting oil, or selling airline seats. Also --and I will talk about this further in
a few minutes -- the existing accounting rules, which quite honestly are rather piecemeal, often are
internally inconsistent and do not cover many types of instruments and transactions, and often allow
hedge accounting or some form of deferral accounting to be applied, thereby affording the treasurer the
opportunity (often not malintentioned) to mask the eroding value of the derivative until the point that
cash or additional collateral goes out the door. I think that this has been changing, and changing
quickly, in the corporate community in the wake of Procter & Gamble, Gibson Greetings, et al., at
mutual funds, and no doubt will now begin to change -- and one assumes at a fairly accelerated rate -- at
state, county, and municipal organizations. I can tell you that having spoken at many such seminars and
invited to speak at countless others, virtually every day in this fair city there is a well-attended
derivatives seminar. Senior management, including CFOs, controllers, and internal and external
auditors, are now eagerly attempting to get up to speed in this area and when they do, sometimes things
do jump out of the woodwork. Let me give you an example. Following a seminar at which I spoke, I got
a call from the controller of an oil and gas company who had attended the seminar and who, upon
ordering a review of his company's derivatives activities, discovered that an internal derivatives trading
group had been established in the past six months, ostensibly to better manage the oil price risk inherent
in the company's business. In looking at the activities of this trading group, however, it became clear
that they were doing more than merely hedging the commodity price risk in the business. In fact, the
daily positions now amounted to five to six times the underlying daily production. Moreover, there was
also active trading in and out of the positions. To date, these had been accounted for using a deferral
approach, even though it seems the objectives were becoming more in line with earning trading profits
and the traders were being compensated based on these trading profits. In fact, it seems the company,
given this activity, seemed more like a commodities dealer than an oil and gas producer. My advice,
with which the controller agreed and which he implemented, was to adopt a mark-to-market approach,
not only because this better reflects the substance of the activity but, more importantly, because of the
discipline that mark-to-market accounting imposes.
With regard to boards of directors and audit committees, the topic of derivatives has been on the agenda
at most companies in the last year. I have attended a number of such meetings. In some cases, the
discussion by board members has been substantive and probing. However, in many other cases,
unfortunately, while the board or audit committee is quick to seek assurances from management and the
external auditor that everything is okay, they are often very reluctant to get into any of the details or
discuss in a substantive way any problems or concerns that may be raised. While I'm not advocating that
board members get into all the nitty-gritty, this is not an area that is susceptible to glossing over. Maybe
the reluctance to get into the details is due in part to the assumed and often actual complexity of the
subject matter. However, I believe it often also reflects board members' concerns over potential
exposure to unwanted liability; that is, on the advice of counsel, they have been told not to delve too far
into this area. This, of course, runs counter to recommendations made by the many studies that have
come out in the past year that have urged boards and audit committees to get more involved. The sad
fact, I believe, is that often because of the fear of litigation and liability, the potential beneficial impact
of boards and audit committees on this and, indeed, on other issues is often not being achieved.
On a related subject, I would also note that the Advisory Panel to the Public Oversight Board, headed
by Don Kirk, in their report on "Strengthening the Professionalism of the Independent Auditor," also
pointed to the need for more effective oversight of management by boards and audit committees. While
I agree with most of what is in the Panel's report, I am concerned that much of the onus was focused on
the auditor improving the level of interface with the board and expanding the extent and quality of the
discussion with audit committees. While I would certainly agree that achieving greater board and audit
committee involvement in the company's controls and financial reporting process and increasing and
enhancing the level of discussion between the external auditor and the audit committee and the board
are highly desirable objectives, I would question the attainability of these goals without serious changes
in corporate governance in this country, a matter which the accounting profession can certainly
encourage but over which we may have little control. As a closing note on this whole subject, I would
also add that foreign companies looking to raise capital often cite as their two main deterrents for
coming to the U.S. public markets the GAAP reconciliation that is required by the SEC in such filings
and also, increasingly, the whole environment of litigation and its effect on corporate governance in this
country. The new Republican majority in Congress, as part of the "Contract with America," has
included litigation reform as one of their priorities. Needless to say, I wish them well.
So those are my views on some of the areas about which, again, I am not the most qualified to speak but
on which, nonetheless, as a participant and observer of the scene, I have, as you can tell by now, some
rather strong views.
Let me then turn, perhaps with a little less trepidation but nonetheless with a number of strong views, to
those areas about which I feel I am better qualified to speak, that is, areas of accounting, disclosure, and
auditing of derivatives activities. With respect to the accounting and disclosure issues, this has clearly
been a long and winding road for the FASB and the SEC. The issues relating to derivatives are part of
the FASB's broader financial instruments project, which is now nearing a decade since its inception. In
fact, I can remember attending the first task force meeting some time after my 9-year-old daughter was
born, and I suspect I may see this activity into her college years. You should all remember that when it
comes to setting new accounting standards, you can't rush genius. The Board attempted to tiptoe into
this area, first by improving disclosures relating to derivatives; thus it issued Statement 105, which
focused on disclosure of information about financial instruments with off-balance-sheet credit risk, in
1990, and Statement 107, on disclosures on fair values of financial instruments, at the end of 1991. It
soon became clear, however, for a variety of reasons, that the disclosures resulting from these two
standards did not do a complete job in properly informing the reader of the extent of a company's use of
derivatives; how that use related to its overall financial risk management; and how it affected the
company's reported results, financial position, and overall risk profile. Thus, in early 1994, the Board,
after several strong suggestions from the SEC and others, found it necessary to revisit the disclosure
area in order to address the many concerns expressed.
All this coincided with increasing revelations by companies of surprise losses from derivatives, as well
as an ever-loudening chorus of demands by Congress and various regulators for more transparent
disclosures of derivatives by companies. I was one of those in that chorus. Clearly, many companies had
taken a minimalist approach to disclosing information under Statements 105 and 107, the biggest
problem, in my view, being that while disclosing the rather sterile quantitative information, they did not
try to put these in the context of the company's over-all financial risk management policies, leaving the
reader often baffled as to what the disclosures meant. I can remember, for example, a reporter calling
me up regarding a certain computer company that, according to a major Wall Street analyst, was using
derivatives to speculate on foreign currency on a large scale. The reporter sent me the analyst's report as
well as the company's annual report and recent 10-Qs and asked me to read them to see if there were
any violations of GAAP and any failure to disclose the extent of its use of foreign currency derivatives.
I dutifully read all the material sent to me by the reporter, but, alas, I could not find any violations of
GAAP or any failure to report anything that was required under Statements 105 and 107. However, it
was difficult to tell from the footnotes and MD&A what the company was doing. Thus, I had to call
back the reporter, tell him that, unfortunately, I could not find any direct violations of the rules, to
which he asked if there was anything I could say on the subject. I told him that I guess that it would
have been nice for the shareholders of the company and any prospective investors in the company to
know that they are investing in a company that was more like a foreign currency dealer than a computer
company since, based on the analyst's report, the company was speculating on foreign currency way
beyond the natural needs of its business.
Does Statement 119 cure all this? The answer is probably not, but it does go a long way toward
expanding and enhancing the disclosures. These now cover all freestanding derivatives, with the
exception of commodity futures and other commodity-based derivatives contracts, which the FASB
decided to exclude because they do not have to be cash-settled. Because of the extent of the required
disclosures under Statement 119, I believe that most companies will feel it is necessary to relate the
disclosures to their overall financial risk and risk management activities. Further, though not required,
Statement 119 encourages additional disclosures, such as those related to how a company assesses and
manages financial risk, i.e., an interest rate GAAP analysis for a bank and value-at-risk calculations for
trading institutions. (In regard to value-at-risk, I would like to make some comments in a few minutes.)
Moreover, the SEC has, through the review of filings for some 500 registrants, already required a
number of companies to significantly expand and enhance their disclosures related to the financial risks
faced by the company and how it manages those risks and how its use of derivatives relates to this risk
management. It has also required disclosure of a company's specific accounting policies relating to
different derivatives, as well as detailed disclosures on a company's derivatives activities during the
year.
My fellow partner and former chairman of the SEC, Richard Breeden, has said that the best regulation
of derivatives lies in improved market disciplines, which in turn depends on full and transparent
disclosure of a company's derivatives activities to the market. I believe that we will see vastly improved
disclosures in the current round of annual reports and agree that this is very healthy. Clearly, sunlight is
the best disinfectant. It can also act on a company as a vaccine; that is, in order to make the disclosures,
a company needs to both gather the information and to understand what it is doing. And, as I have
previously noted, when a company does so, it sometimes finds things it may not have been fully aware
of before.
Now, let me move on to the accounting. This has been a most vexing area because it not only highlights
some of the core concerns with the historical cost model but also has surfaced some of the practical and
conceptual problems that arise as we move from the historical cost model to a more market- or fair
value-based accounting.
The Board has now been reconsidering the accounting for derivatives in earnest for some three years
and has during that period changed direction a number of times. This has been a difficult project for the
Board. The Board seemed headed for a possible speedier conclusion to this project back in June 1993
when it issued a document entitled "A Report on Deliberations Including Tentative Conclusions on
Certain Issues Related to Accounting and Hedging and Other Risk-Adjusting Activities." While certain
of the tentative conclusions in the Report on Deliberations contemplated potentially significant changes
in the rules on accounting for derivatives and synthetics, the Board, at least at that point in time,
continued to embrace the concepts of hedge accounting and synthetic instrument accounting. For
example, while it was proposed that all freestanding derivatives be carried at market or fair value, hedge
accounting would have been permitted for qualifying hedges of existing assets and liabilities and for
firm commitments. Whether or not hedge accounting should be permitted for hedges of anticipated or
forecasted transactions was left undecided, with several Board members sharing the concerns voiced by
the chief accountant of the SEC over both the conceptual propriety of permitting deferral of gains and
losses on such transactions and the practical concern over the ability to develop workable rules that
would prevent companies from deferring losses in situations where the expected transactions might
never materialize. The tentative conclusions also proposed a new method of hedge accounting, termed
the "partial effectiveness method." Under this method, a hedge is considered effective to the extent that
cumulative changes in the fair value of the hedging instrument do not exceed the (inverse) cumulative
changes in the fair value of the item being hedged with any excess change in the fair value of the
hedging instrument over the (inverse) change in the value of the hedged item being recognized currently
in earnings. For financial institutions and other entities that manage net interest rate or currency risk of
their over-all asset/liability position, the Report on Deliberations proposed an elective mark-to-market
pool approach under which all components of a dynamically managed portfolio (i.e., assets, liabilities,
commitments, and related derivatives) would be measured at market or fair value with the resulting
gains and losses reported in current period earnings. Finally, with regard to synthetics, the Report on
Deliberations described an approach under which a company would combine and initially measure the
separate financial instruments used to create the synthetic as a single financial instrument measured at
the net proceeds received or paid. In subsequent financial reporting periods, the company would
recognize in current period earnings any difference between the combined fair values of the separate
instruments and the fair value of the "prototype" instrument that the company was trying to
synthetically create.
Since June 1993, when the Report on Deliberations was issued, the Board has continued its discussions
on this topic. As evidenced by these discussions, the Report on Deliberations, though a noteworthy and
interesting document, represented a very preliminary set of thoughts, and, as I mentioned before, the
Board has since changed direction several times. While this may be due in part to the fact that two of
the seven FASB members at the time of the Report on Deliberations retired and were replaced by new
Board members, the heightened focus on derivatives in general and on the accounting for derivatives in
particular by Congress, the GAO, the SEC, and others, together with the wave of reported losses and
"busts" involving derivatives, has undoubtedly impacted on Board members' thinking. Critics of the
current rules argue that not only are they incomplete and internally inconsistent, but moreover, any type
of deferral accounting, whether it be in the guise of hedge accounting or synthetic instrument
accounting, is harmful because it often masks the extent of a company's involvement with derivatives as
well as the potential losses the company may suffer from using these instruments. An accounting
method is needed, it is argued, that is not only less complex and that leaves less room for subjective
judgments, but that also gives greater visibility to a company's use of derivatives by making sure they
are captured on the balance sheet. Mark-to-market accounting, it is argued, will achieve all these
objectives.
Thus it was that during 1994, while continuing to explore various hedge accounting methods, the Board
also began to examine possible alternative mark-to-market approaches. As part of this effort, the Board
considered a number of models that, while measuring all free-standing derivatives at market or fair
value, also attempted to provide some sort of special or hedge accounting for a broad array of hedging
and risk management techniques, including dynamic portfolio management, hedging forecasted
transactions, and managing exposures to changes in cash flows and market values. In each case,
however, Board members found that the methods proposed were either too complex and/or yielded
results that were conceptually difficult to justify. Accordingly, in November 1994, the Board, in an
effort to move the project ahead, instructed the FASB staff to develop a model under which a company
would classify all freestanding derivatives into two categories -- "trading" and "other than trading."
Derivatives classified as trading (which would include derivatives used to manage risk in a trading
portfolio) would be measured at market or fair value with all gains and losses, realized and unrealized,
recognized currently in earnings. Derivatives classified as other than trading would also be measured at
market or fair value. However, the unrealized gains and losses would be included in a separate
component of stockholders' equity until realized, at which point the realized gain or loss would be
transferred from stock-holders' equity and recognized in earnings. Since November 1994, the Board has
been continuing down the path of developing this approach, having also tentatively decided that
commodity futures and other commodity-based derivatives that entitle the holder to settle in cash or via
receipt or delivery of the commodity, as well as certain other instruments that have derivative-like
characteristics, such as interest-only strips and some structured notes, should also be encompassed by
this proposed accounting approach. The Board has also tentatively decided that with regard to regulated
futures, the daily settlement for changes in value via variation margin should be treated as an event of
realization requiring immediate recognition of the value change in earnings.
The proposed approach, which is similar to the one adopted by the Board for debt and marketable
equity securities in Statement No. 115, would effectively eliminate hedge accounting and synthetic
instrument accounting as they are now known. Proponents of this approach argue that it has a number of
advantages, including the following:
It captures on the balance sheet the fair value of all derivatives used by a company. As a
result, it may provide the reader with in "early warning" of any major adverse changes in
such fair values. Thus, it over-comes the weakness of current hedge accounting practices
that have sometimes masked major potential adverse changes by keeping them off-balance-
sheet.
Accounting will not depend on the type of instrument used or the type of risk hedged. The
proposed approach is broad and consistent for a wide range of instruments and a wide range
of hedging, risk management, and risk selection strategies.
The approach and the resulting accounting procedures are simple and easy to understand.
As a result, it should be much less costly to implement than the current rules.
If the maturities of the hedged items and the hedging instruments are matched, the proposed
approach still provides for appropriate offsetting of gains and losses in the income
statement. The wide array of available over-the-counter and customized derivatives should
permit entities to choose those instruments that will enable them to accomplish this
objective.
Entities would have the flexibility to decide when derivative-related gains or losses would
be reported in the income statement because the timing of realizing those gains or losses
would be within their control.
On the other hand, opponents of the proposed approach believe that the proposal's focus on the balance
sheet treatment of derivatives will result in an inappropriate portrayal of hedging activities in the
income statement. In effect, the traditional hedge accounting and "matching" concepts have been
ignored by this proposal. For example:
Entities would not be able to fix the U.S. dollar cost of commitments to purchase fixed
assets from foreign suppliers. The gains or losses on the forward-exchange contracts
entered for this purpose would be included initially in stockholders' equity and transferred
to earnings when the contract matures or is sold prior to maturity. They cannot be part of
the basis of the fixed asset purchased.
Derivatives that hedge inventory or any other assets or liabilities that are carried at cost
would cause changes in equity but the offsetting gains or losses on the hedged items would
not be reflected on the balance sheet.
The use of derivatives to permanently hedge translation adjustments reported in equity
(e.g., on hedges of a net investment in a foreign subsidiary) would be effectively
eliminated.
The proposed approach would eliminate synthetic instrument accounting, even for "plain
vanilla" interest rate swaps that synthetically change fixed-rate debt into floating and vice
versa.
It would increase volatility of stockholders' equity. Under the current accounting model,
certain assets and most liabilities are carried on an historical cost basis. However, the
derivatives that were acquired to hedge these items will be measured at fair value, with
unrealized gains and losses, immediately impacting stockholders' equity. Thus, even if the
change in the value of the derivative perfectly offsets the change in value in the hedged
item, stockholders' equity will only reflect the change in the value of the former. As a
result, the proposed approach treats stockholders' equity as a "dumpster" by adding
unrealized derivative-related gains and losses to the list of other items recorded in equity
under current GAAP, e.g., foreign currency translation adjustments and unrealized gains
and losses on available-for-sale securities. The Board has severely clouded what constitutes
"income" and has not adequately explained why the expanded stockholders' equity section
would now be better for the financial statement users. Whatever happened to the "clean"
surplus theory?
In an effort to properly match the timing of recognition in earnings of gains and losses on
derivatives with the related gains or losses on the items being hedged, companies may, of
necessity, increasingly have to turn to over-the-counter instruments that may be more risky
than exchange-traded futures and options. This would seem particularly true in the case of
futures, where the daily settlement would be treated as a realized gain or loss.
Clearly, entities in different industries would be affected differently by this proposal. Companies
sensitive to fluctuations in capital, such as banks and other regulated entities, would probably oppose
the proposal. On the other hand, many commercial entities may welcome the freedom and flexibility
offered by the proposal to hedge any type of risk with any type of derivative. This is particularly
relevant in the area of hedging forecasted transactions because current hedge accounting rules require
that if a hedging instrument does not meet specified criteria, it should be marked-to-market with the
changes recorded in the income statement.
Whichever the case, companies will certainly need to carefully reassess and appropriately modify their
hedging and risk management approaches should this proposed approach be enacted by the Board.
What do I think about the Board's current direction? I must confess I am somewhat schizophrenic on
this proposal. The practitioner in me, tired of the daily debates related to the current rules and the lack
of clarity and subjectivity, says to himself, at least this approach is simple, uniform, and objective. On
the other hand, the theoretical accountant in me, perhaps too used to the "matching" concept and the
notion that a meaningful portrayal of earnings is the keystone of financial reporting, is troubled by this
proposal. While it would now capture all derivatives on the balance sheet, it would do so, in my view, at
a high cost. In further expanding the use of stockholders' equity as a dumping ground, it, in my view,
further dilutes the meaning of earnings and net income. All this is at a time when, according to the
Jenkins Committee and the AIMR study "Financial Reporting in the 1990s and Beyond," the analysts
are looking for a return to the clean surplus approach with an ability to capture and distinguish within
net income the results of all activities.
Overall, it seems to me that the approach that the Board seemed headed toward in its June 1993 Report
on Deliberations was more promising. That is an approach that would recognize that one size does not
fit all in terms of accounting for derivatives. For financial institutions and other entities that manage
portfolios of both on- and off-financial instruments, it seems to me that the right answer in the end is
mark-to-market or fair value for all financial instruments, including derivatives. However, when you get
to hedging of other exposures that are not yet recorded on the balance sheet or are related to assets or
liabilities that are not carried at fair value, then a more traditional hedge accounting model should be
permitted. However, its use should be circumscribed to those situations where the intent and effect is
clear and virtually certain.
Before leaving the subject of accounting and disclosure, I think it is important to realize that while
added detailed disclosures and a better and more comprehensive set of accounting rules are clearly
necessary and desirable, they are not the only and maybe even not the best way of conveying
information on a company's use of derivatives and on its over-all financial risk profile. In that regard,
we should remember that over the past five to seven years there has sprung up the discipline of financial
risk management, involving highly quantitative techniques that are designed to quantify in a
standardized way the extent of market risk inherent in a particular portfolio of financial instruments and
related derivatives, and, indeed, the financial risk across all the portfolios in an institution. Out of this
has come a concept of value-at-risk, which is a measure of the potential loss resulting from hypothetical
changes in market factors such as interest rates and foreign exchange rates for a given time period. For
example, a particular institution might define its value-at-risk as the potential daily loss across all the
financial instruments in its portfolio that would result from adverse market movements within, say, a 95
percent confidence level. By providing this sort of benchmark, the company is not only providing a
measure of the riskiness of its portfolio but is also indirectly conveying information about the extent to
which it hedges or speculates. Now, a number of major financial institutions are already providing this
type of disclosure, and its use is being increasingly endorsed by the SEC and other regulators. In this
regard, I think an analogy can be made between the development of this kind of quantitative discipline
and its possible use as a benchmark disclosure with the development many years ago of actuarial
techniques and their subsequent use in pension accounting and disclosures.
Let me move briefly now to some of the auditing issues relating to derivatives and how these have, for
example, impacted our practice. We, of course, audit a wide spectrum of entities across all industry
sectors. Ten years ago it was largely only the securities firms where we had to worry to any great extent
about auditing derivatives. This is no longer the case. And thus, we have had to meet this challenge by
training our people, by developing new tools, including, for example, derivatives controls
questionnaires, and by developing or purchasing our own valuation models. It has also opened up major
new service areas for us, such as financial risk management consulting and internal control-related
services. For example, starting about three to four years ago, we decided to create a global financial risk
management practice consisting of professional financial risk managers, and we now have core groups
in New York, London, and Tokyo that can go into a company or institution, map and quantify its
financial risks, and advise on risk management strategies' and related systems, procedures, and controls.
Often, in more complex situations, we use these individuals as part of our audit evaluation of a
particular company. I noted that we have created or purchased a variety of derivatives valuation models
and have trained many of our staff on these. In certain circumstances, however, a client -- most notably
a derivatives product dealer -- may have certain very complex or long-dated instruments in its portfolio
(for example, a 40-year Swedish krona swap containing a series of embedded caps and floors). In such
circumstances, we have turned to outside specialists to help us assess the reasonableness of the client's
valuation procedures, methodologies, and end results. A number of these outside specialists come from
academia, such names as Hull and White, and Gifford Fong, to name a few.
Finally, I would like to leave you with a few thoughts and perhaps suggestions regarding how all this
may impact on your activities. First, of course, there are curriculum issues. Just as we have had to train
our people to understand derivatives, how companies use them, and what the audit, accounting, and
disclosure implications are, I believe that this subject matter needs, as appropriate, to be built into your
accounting and auditing courses. In today's world, I believe this would be a serious omission. Enough
said. Secondly, with regard to academic research, this whole area provides very fertile ground. With all
the fuss in the past year, with new disclosures and with likely changes in the accounting rules, there
would seem to be a whole host of opportunities for academic research on, for example, how each of
these things has impacted stock prices overall, particular industries, particular companies, and how new
regulations, new disclosures, and new accounting rules impact companies' approaches to risk
management. I hope that my comments here tonight may have stimulated your thoughts on other areas
for research.
In closing, I would just say that derivatives are clearly here to stay and that it is important that we all
understand that, if used properly, they can be extremely valuable financial tools, but that, as events of
the past year have shown, if not properly understood or controlled, they can be extremely dangerous to a
particular entity. I am optimistic that recent events, while certainly sobering, are already beginning to
have a very salutary effect on the various participants in the market. That is good, because I would not
mind a respite from the battlefield duty.
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
Question:
Sometimes these transactions really aren't as bad as they seem. It's a general image that companies that
engage in derivative transactions are doing something terrible, and it may not really be terrible. Assume
someone wanted to buy a house and needed to have a mortgage for $100,000 and would have preferred
a fixed rate of 9 percent. And assume he was able to get a variable rate, and then actually entered into an
interest rate swap, and at the end of the day converted that transaction into a fixed rate of 8-1/2 percent.
So if he just went to a bank and borrowed $100, 000 and paid 9 but because he is high-techish had
managed to end up paying 8-1/2, that would be deemed to be smart and prudent and not particularly
unusual -- he accomplished something good. But on the other hand, if someone said that my neighbor is
entering into derivatives and interest rate swaps, it would sound fantastically complicated and risky.
Answer:
That's a very good observation: put it all in balance. Recently, somebody tabulated the reported losses. I
think the number for publicly reported losses may have added up to approximately 15 billion dollars.
We are talking about a market that some have estimated at 35 trillion. So we are talking about the losses
being a very small segment. Most companies are using these in a healthy way, the way they are meant
to be used, without getting too exotic or beyond the natural exposures of the company. But there is that
temptation out there to increase yield by using things like debt to reduce borrowing costs and be the
instant hero. These are some of the things I talked about. Thank you.

